The 1953 Iranian Coup: Operation Ajax and a Geopolitical Turning Point | Listening Comprehension

Our topic today is a single event in 1953 that, in many ways, drew the map for the next 70 years of political relationships in the Middle East. I’m referring to the overthrow of Iran’s first democratically elected Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, in a clandestine operation known as “Operation Ajax.”

To understand the complex relationship between Iran and the West, particularly the United States and Great Britain, one cannot ignore these events. The 1979 Islamic Revolution, which is often seen as the start of the modern conflict, is, in the eyes of many historians and Iranians, the end of a story that began in 1953. This lecture will focus on the “how and why” of this 1953 coup, looking at the motivations of the three main actors: Iranian nationalism, British imperial interests, and American Cold War geopolitical strategy.

First, let’s set the stage. The story begins, as it so often does, with a natural resource: oil. By the mid-20th century, Iran’s economy was dominated by a single entity: the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, or AIOC. This company, which we know today as BP, was majority-owned by the British government. And the terms of its deal with Iran were, by any modern standard, astonishingly one-sided.

The AIOC operated a massive refinery in Abadan—then the largest in the world. It paid almost nothing in taxes to the Iranian government. Britain, for example, received more in taxes from the AIOC’s profits than Iran received in total revenue for its own oil. The company operated as a state within a state, with segregated towns for its British and Iranian workers, and it refused to open its books to Iranian government auditors. This was the central, burning grievance of the Iranian people.

Into this picture steps Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh. It is vital to understand who he was. He was not a cleric. He was not a communist. He was a wealthy, European-educated, secular nationalist and a passionate democrat. He was also, by all accounts, highly charismatic, known for his emotional speeches and for receiving foreign diplomats in his pajamas from his bed. In 1951, his “National Front” movement championed a single idea: nationalization. The idea that Iran’s oil should belong to the Iranians.

This idea was electrifyingly popular. The Iranian Majlis, or parliament, passed the nationalization bill unanimously, and Mossadegh was swept into the Prime Minister’s office.

For Britain, this was a catastrophe. The AIOC’s profits were, quite literally, propping up Britain’s post-World War II economy. Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s government immediately and aggressively retaliated. Their first move was economic warfare. The Royal Navy instituted a crushing embargo, a blockade that stopped any tanker from leaving Iran’s ports. They froze Iranian assets. Iran had the oil, but it could not sell a single drop. The Iranian economy, deprived of its only real source of revenue, began to spiral into chaos.

Britain also took legal action, which Mossadegh famously rebutted. He argued at the UN and the International Court of Justice at The Hague, making a simple, powerful case: this was a matter of national sovereignty. He argued that Britain had nationalized its own coal and steel industries, and Iran, as a sovereign nation, had the right to do the same. He won. The court ruled it had no jurisdiction.

Having failed legally and economically, Britain turned to a more covert solution. MI6, their intelligence service, began to formulate a plan for a coup d’état. But they knew they couldn’t do it alone. They needed a more powerful partner. They needed the United States.

This is the most critical pivot in the story. Britain first appealed to President Harry Truman. Truman, however, was a firm anti-colonialist. He saw the crisis exactly as Mossadegh did: as a case of British imperialism. He refused to help, fearing that a coup would, in fact, push Iran into the arms of the Soviet Union.

But in 1952, there was a change in Washington. The Eisenhower administration came to power, and with it, two of the most influential anti-communists of the era: the Dulles brothers. John Foster Dulles became Secretary of State, and Allen Dulles became the Director of the brand-new CIA.

This new administration had a very different sense of pragmatism. They viewed the world almost exclusively through the lens of the Cold War. For them, every local nationalist movement was a potential gateway for communism.

The British government, now under Winston Churchill, understood this. They changed their argument. They stopped talking about “our lost oil profits” and started talking about “the communist threat.” Their “proof” was the Tudeh Party, Iran’s communist party. As the British embargo strangled Iran’s economy, unemployment and poverty soared, making the Tudeh Party more popular. The British, in effect, created the very crisis they now warned against.

This was the pretext the Dulles brothers needed. They were convinced, or allowed themselves to be convinced, that Mossadegh was either a secret communist or was too weak to stop a Tudeh takeover. The fall of Iran, they argued, would give the Soviets a “warm water port” and control of the Middle East’s oil. The decision was made. Operation Ajax was approved.

The CIA’s man on the ground, Kermit Roosevelt Jr.—a grandson of Teddy Roosevelt—was given a budget of one million dollars and a simple objective: remove Mossadegh and re-install the young, compliant monarch, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as the true leader of Iran.

The plan was a complex mix of propaganda and bribery. The CIA and MI6 used their networks to bribe journalists, clerics, and politicians to spread “black propaganda”—fake news stories that Mossadegh was not only pro-communist but also anti-religious and secretly corrupt. They sowed dissension within his political coalition.

The linchpin of the plan was to get the Shah to sign two firmans, or royal decrees: one dismissing Mossadegh, the other appointing the CIA’s chosen replacement, General Fazlollah Zahedi.

The coup was set for August 15th, 1953. But it failed. Mossadegh’s loyal intelligence chief learned of the plot. When the Shah’s envoy delivered the decree, he was arrested. Mossadegh went on the radio and announced a coup attempt had been thwarted. The Tudeh Party flooded the streets, celebrating the victory. General Zahedi went into hiding. And the Shah, terrified, fled the country, first to Baghdad and then to Rome. It looked, for all the world, like Mossadegh had won.

In Langley and London, the order was given: “Abort the mission.”

But Kermit Roosevelt, in Tehran, made a fateful decision. He ignored the order. He still had millions in cash. And he saw an opportunity in the chaos. He decided to double down.

He and his team took the Tudeh supporters’ victory celebrations and turned them into a weapon. They used their remaining funds to hire their own mobs—paid street thugs, wrestlers, and circus performers—to rampage through Tehran on August 16th and 17th. Critically, these mobs pretended to be Tudeh supporters. They smashed shop windows, attacked mosques, and shouted pro-communist slogans, all while praising Mossadegh.

The propaganda campaign had worked. The secular middle class, the business owners, and the religious establishment were now terrified, believing a communist takeover was imminent. The military, which had been on the fence, was now convinced that Mossadegh had lost control.

On August 19th, the final phase began. The CIA’s paid agents, now joined by legitimate anti-communist protestors and the military, converged on Mossadegh’s home. After a brief but intense battle, his government fell. General Zahedi emerged from hiding to take power. The Shah was flown back from Rome and restored to the Peacock Throne. Mossadegh was arrested, put on trial for treason, and lived the rest of his life under house arrest.

The coup was a “success.” But what was the aftermath?

The Shah’s rule, for the next 25 years, was autocratic. He had been re-installed not by his people, but by foreign powers, and he ruled accordingly, with his power enforced by his notorious secret police, the SAVAK. He became America’s staunchest ally in the Cold War.

And the oil? It was “de-nationalized.” But it wasn’t returned to Britain. A new consortium was formed. British Petroleum (the former AIOC) had to settle for a 40% stake. The other 60% was divided, with American companies getting 40%. The United States, which had no stake in Iranian oil before 1953, was now a dominant player.

In conclusion, Operation Ajax was a short-term tactical victory for the West. It secured the oil and created a “pillar” of anti-Soviet stability. But it did so by destroying Iran’s secular democratic movement. It planted a deep and bitter grievance in the Iranian psyche, a memory of foreign interference that directly fueled the anti-Western, anti-Shah, and anti-American fury of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The 1953 coup is a profound lesson in “blowback”—where a short-term, clandestine solution creates a far larger, long-term strategic problem.